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CAN THE RETAIL INVESTOR SURVIVE THE
FIDUCIARY STANDARD?
PAUL R. WALSH† AND DAVID W. JOHNS‡
For the retail investor in the United States, generally two
options are available for seeking professional investment advice
to reach their financial goals: hiring a broker-dealer or an
investment adviser. Each entity is governed under separate
regulatory schemes. With the recent financial collapse and the
ensuing jump to regulation, there is a push to make a uniform
standard for all investment recommendations—a fiduciary
standard—that would be a one-size-fits-all reaction, leading to
less access and higher costs for the smaller investor.1 Continued
regulation of more disclosure and transparency in the investment
sales process, stronger requirements of the investment sales
person, proliferation of common sense education of the investing
public in handling their own money, and swifter punishment
under existing rules of bad actors should be the regulatory focus.
I.

REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF BROKER-DEALER AND
INVESTMENT ADVISORS

Regulation of broker-dealers is primarily under the purview
of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”)
antifraud authority within the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities
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1
See Michael Finke & Thomas P. Langdon, The Impact of the Broker-Dealer
Fiduciary Standard on Financial Advice, 25 J. FIN. PLAN. 28, 33 (2012) (imposing a
uniform fiduciary standard on both investment advisors and broker-dealers does not
account for individual client characteristics and business models, and will result in
adverse consequences).
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Act”), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”),
Exchange Act rules and Self-Regulatory Organization (“SRO”)
rules. A broker-dealer’s obligations to its customers flow from
the SEC, and the rules, case law, disciplinary actions, and
enforcement actions promulgated by its primary SRO, the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). FINRA’s
primary responsibility is to protect investors from abusive
practices caused by the conflicting financial interests between
broker-dealers and their client, and the rules impose suitability
obligations on broker’s recommendations.2
Conversely, regulation of investment advisers falls under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), which imposes
a fiduciary duty on the adviser to act in its client’s best interests.3
Arguably, the key difference in regulation is the regulatory
approach: rule-based versus principle-based.
A.

Broker-Dealer Regulation: Rule-Based Regulation

Broker-dealer regulation has generally been described as the
duty to deal fairly with customers, adhere to high standards of
commercial honor and fair and equitable trade principles, and
respect specific obligations, including ensuring investment
suitability and disclosing certain conflicts of interest.4 The
primary legislation for broker-dealer regulation is the Exchange
Act. Under the Exchange Act, a broker is defined as “any person
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for
the account of others,” whereas a dealer is defined as “any person
engaged in the business of buying and selling securities . . . for
such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise.”5 The
Exchange Act provides for detailed regulation of the conduct of
broker-dealers, including investor protection provisions in the
form of antifraud controls that prohibit both the
misrepresentation or omission of material facts and fraudulent or
manipulative practices in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.6
2
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N STAFF, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND
BROKER-DEALERS
iv
(2011)
[hereinafter
SEC STUDY],
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf (noting that broker-dealers
are obligated, by statutory provisions, to deal fairly with clients).
3
Id. at 21–22.
4
Id. at 106.
5
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A)–(5)(A) (2006).
6
SEC STUDY, supra note 2, at 53.

FINAL_WALSH & JOHNS

2013]

2/27/2014 6:23 PM

RETAIL INVESTOR AND FIDUCIARY STANDARD

439

Shortly after it passed the Exchange Act, Congress passed
the Maloney Act Amendments, which established a system of
self-regulation for broker-dealers and resulted in what is now
FINRA.7 The Maloney Act created and empowered a variety of
SROs, including national securities exchanges and the NASD—
now known as FINRA—to have extensive oversight over
securities broker-dealers and other market players.8 Thus, while
the Exchange Act rules are more focused on fraud prevention and
are the backdrop for broker-dealer obligations, FINRA rules,
among others, address unethical behavior that may not rise to
the level of fraud.
B.

Investment Advisers Act: Principle-Based Regulation

In 1935, the SEC commissioned a study of investment trusts
A product of the study, the
and investment companies.9
Investment Counsel Report (“Counsel Report”), revealed that the
number and amount of assets investment advisers managed was
ambiguous.10 The Counsel Report identified two major problems:
(1) harm to the public inflicted by dishonest advisers; and
(2) reputational harm to legitimate investment advisers.11 In
response to these problems, Congress passed the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940,12 subjecting investment advisers to
statutory fiduciary standards.13 While some provisions and rules
impose specific prohibitions or requirements, the fiduciary duty
is the main governor of the adviser-client relationship.14 While
the term “fiduciary” is not found in the Advisers Act, the Act
prohibits investment advisers from engaging in fraudulent or

7

See Maloney Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2006)) (providing guidelines for registering as a
national securities association with the SEC).
8
Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial
Industry, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665, 693 (2010).
9
See H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477 (1939).
10
See id. at 2, 8.
11
See S. REP. NO. 76-1755, at 21 (1940).
12
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to -21 (2006)).
13
See id. § 206(3), 54 Stat. at 852 (codified as amended at § 80b-6).
14
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191, 194
(1963) (interpreting the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 as Congressional
recognition of the fiduciary relationship between investment advisers and their
clients).
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deceptive transactions and imposes on them a duty to make
disclosures to their clients even when there is no intent to
defraud.15
Congress defined an “investment adviser” as “any person
who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to
the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in,
purchasing, or selling securities.”16 As a consequence of such a
broad definition, broker-dealers fell within its purview and were
subject to its reach.17 Thus, the broker-dealer exclusion was
born. Because broker-dealers were regulated by the Exchange
Act, Congress excluded broker-dealers from the Advisers Act if
two conditions were met: (1) the broker’s advice was “solely
incidental” to brokerage services; and (2) the broker did not
receive any “special compensation” for the advice.18 The term
“solely incidental” was not defined, but legislative history
specifies that the exclusion will apply only if the compensation
received by the broker-dealer is strictly commission-based.19
C.

Standards of Conduct

Brokers must meet a suitability standard when providing
information regarding financial products. “Suitability” means
that there is a reasonable basis for investment recommendations
with regard to a customer’s financial situation.20 The suitability
standard does not require a broker to recommend the best
possible product for the situation, nor does it require the broker
to notify the client that another broker could perform the
transaction for less commission; rather, it requires the broker to
find the “best execution” for the product.21

15

15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006) (effective July 22, 2010).
Id. § 80b-2(a)(11).
17
Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 403 (2010).
18
SEC STUDY, supra note 2, at 15–16; 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C).
19
See S. REP. NO. 76-1755, at 22 (1940); Laby, supra note 17, at 403.
20
SEC STUDY, supra note 2, at 52 n.226.
21
See id. at 69 (explaining that broker-dealers are legally obligated to obtain
the most favorable terms reasonably available in executing a customer’s trades). But
cf. id. at 54 (stating that “courts have found broker-dealers to have a fiduciary duty
under certain circumstances”).
16
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The suitability standard is codified in the recently enacted
FINRA Rule 2111 and uses a broker’s “recommendation” to a
customer as the “triggering event” for its application.22 What
constitutes a “recommendation” is determined by the facts and
circumstances surrounding the transaction.23 Under FINRA
Rule 2111, investment strategies involving securities, regardless
of whether the recommendation results in a transaction, must be
suitable even if the recommended strategy is to hold a particular
investment and do nothing.24 Rule 2111 explicitly sets forth the
information that a broker-dealer must attempt to obtain and
review in order to perform a sufficient suitability analysis. This
information includes the client’s age, investment experience, time
horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, tax status, financial
situation and needs, investment objectives, and other holdings.25
A broker-dealer, through its associated persons, must document
with specificity its basis for believing that a particular factor is
not relevant in determining suitability for a particular client in
order to be exempt from gathering that information.26
Rule 2111 consists of three main obligations: reasonable
basis suitability, customer-specific suitability, and quantitative
suitability.27 Reasonable basis suitability requires that a broker’s
recommendation is suitable for at least some investors based
upon the potential risks and rewards associated with
recommending that security.28
Customer-specific suitability
requires that the broker’s recommendation is suitable for a
particular investor based upon that investor’s investment
profile.29 Quantitative suitability requires that a broker with
actual or de facto control over a customer’s account have a
reasonable basis for a series of recommendations and prohibits
the broker from making excessive and unsuitable transactions
for the customer.30 When determining quantitative suitability,

22
FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 11-02, KNOW YOUR
CUSTOMER AND SUITABILITY 2 (2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/
industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p122778.pdf.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 3.
25
Id. at 2.
26
Id. at 4.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
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the transactions must be viewed as a whole considering the
customer’s investment profile.31 In sum, Rule 2111 requires that
a broker fully understand both the recommended product and the
customer; a lack of either understanding is a suitability
violation.32
II. THE GAME-CHANGERS
A.

The Blurring of the Broker-Dealer/Investment Advisor Line

In the 1990s, some brokerage firms started offering feebased, as opposed to commission-based, compensation.33
Increased competition between broker-dealers resulted in the
prioritization of revenue stabilization and the movement to feebased brokerage services.34
At the same time, the SEC
commissioned a committee to review the conflicts of interest in
the brokerage industry and the recommended “best practices” for
a compensation structure for registered representatives of
broker-dealers.35 It recommended that a portion of a registered
representative’s compensation be based upon the assets held in
the account regardless of whether any transactions occur,
resulting in a continued “revenue stream” for the broker and
reducing the risk of “churning” in the account.36 As fee-based
brokerage services grew, the distinction between investment
advisors and broker-dealers became ambiguous. Each now had
analogous functions and similar compensation schemes, which
could be considered “special compensation” under the Advisers
Act because the schemes were not commission-based.37 Brokerdealers found themselves backed into a corner.
31

Id.
Id.
33
COMM. ON COMP. PRACTICES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION
PRACTICES 3 (1995), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/bkrcomp.txt
[hereinafter REPORT ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES].
34
See Leslie Wayne, The Discounters Storm Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26,
1982, at 3 (explaining how full-service firms are competing with discount firms by
offering products not offered by discount firms, and on a fee for service basis).
35
REPORT ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES, supra note 33, at 4–5.
36
Id. at 10; Laby, supra note 17, at 406.
37
See Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-51,523, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2376, 70
Fed. Reg. 20,424, 20,425 (Apr. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Release No. 51,523] (defining
“special compensation” as involving “the receipt by a broker-dealer of compensation
other than brokerage commissions or dealer compensation); see also Certain Broker32
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Application of the Advisers Act to fee-based accounts
presented numerous new regulations, in addition to the
regulatory scheme already in place for broker-dealers. Of
primary concern was section 206(3) of the Advisers Act, which
bars certain transactions, unless written disclosure is provided to
the client and consent is given prior to each transaction.38 This
requirement, because of the active nature of the markets, would
effectively ban a broker’s ability to effect principal trades for its
account.39 In response, the SEC enacted Rule 202(a)(11)-1 under
the Advisers Act, which prevents the application of the Act to
broker-dealers due to a fee-based structure if three conditions
were met: (1) the advice provided was not discretionary; (2) the
advice was solely incidental to brokerage services; and (3) the
broker-dealer informed the customer that their account was a
brokerage account.40 The rule did not sit well with investment
advisers because, in their view, it circumvented the fiduciary
duty and disclosure protections given to clients under the
Advisers Act and fostered competition with broker-dealers who
were not required to adhere to equivalent regulatory
responsibilities.41 This culminated in the 2007 decision by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Washington, D.C. Circuit in
Financial Planning Association v. SEC.42

Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisors, Exchange Act Release No. 42,099,
Investment Advisors Act Release No. 1845, 64 Fed. Reg. 61,226, 61,228 (Nov. 4,
1999) (receiving compensation other than traditional brokerage commission may
constitute “special compensation”).
38
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2006); see
Opinion of Director of Trading and Exchange, Relating to Section 206 of the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and
Sections 10(b) and 15(c) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 8, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,997 (Feb. 5, 1945) (noting that an
investment advisor is a fiduciary, and therefore, must act in the client’s best
interests and obtain consent before effecting a transaction).
39
See Laby, supra note 17, at 408 (explaining that the speed of electronic
trading inhibits advisors ability to effect such transactions because they do not have
time to comply with the requirements of section 206(3)).
40
Id. at 409.
41
SEC Release No. 51,523, supra note 37, at 11.
42
482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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Financial Planning Association v. SEC

Rule 202(a) (11)-1 did not have a long existence. It was
overruled, which revived the question of whether broker-dealers
were subject to the Advisers Act for fee-based accounts.43 The
primary argument of the Financial Planning Association (“FPA”)
was that the SEC lacked the statutory authority to implement
the rule.44
Conversely, the SEC argued that Section
202(a)(11)(F), which provides the SEC with the power to exclude
“such other persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as
the [SEC] may designate,” gave it the authority to exclude
certain brokers from the Advisers Act that do receive special
compensation because the investment advice provided was the
same as that provided by brokers already excluded from the
Act.45 Specifically, the argument was that the advice was
incidental to the brokerage services provided.46 However, the
Court found the rule at odds with the Advisers Act, and thus,
struck it down.47
Because of the massive amount of assets accrued in feebased brokerage accounts at the time of the Court’s decision, the
SEC obtained a stay until October 1, 2007.48 The SEC ultimately
decided that by the expiration of the stay, customers had to
decide to either “convert their fee-based brokerage accounts to
advisory accounts or to traditional commission-based brokerage
accounts.”49
Therefore, the issue of whether a broker’s
investment advice is the same as an investment adviser’s advice
remained unsettled. That is, until the financial crisis of 2008,
when these issues became the forefront of discussion yet again.

43

See id. at 493 (vacating the Broker-Dealer Rule).
See id. at 487 (contending that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority by
excepting from IAA coverage a group of broker-dealers Congress did not identify and
intend to except in subsection (C)).
45
Id. at 488.
46
See id. at 487–88 (referring to Section 202(a)(1)(C) that excepts from IAA
coverage brokers or dealers whose investment advisory services are “solely
incidental” to their regular business and who do not receive additional commission
for such services).
47
Id. at 488.
48
Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, No. 04-1242, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15169 (D.C.
Cir. June 25, 2007).
49
Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2653, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,022, 55,024 (Sept. 24,
2007).
44
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The Dodd-Frank Act

After much debate in the legislative branches, Congress
enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) to address the triggers of the 2008
financial crisis. Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act mandated the
SEC to perform a study to examine broker-dealer and investment
adviser duties to their clients prior to any rulemaking.50
Specifically, the SEC was to evaluate, among other things, the
following: (1) the effectiveness of the existing legal or regulatory
standards of care for personalized investment advice and
recommendations to retail customers; and (2) the existence of
regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps in regard to the
protection of retail customers that should be addressed.51
Moreover, section 913 explicitly gives the SEC the authority to
require broker-dealers and investment advisers to adhere to a
universal fiduciary duty when providing personalized securitiesrelated investment advice to retail customers.52 The SEC study
was released in January 2011, and among other findings, found
that investors are often confused by differing standards of care
that apply to investment advisers and broker-dealers.53
Consequently, the major recommendation made by the SEC was
to merge the standards of care for broker-dealers and investment
advisors into a universal standard.54 In other words, when
personalized investment advice is given to retail customers, the
best interest of the customer takes priority without regard to the
financial interest or other interest of the broker, dealer, or
investment adviser giving the advice.
B.

No One Can Serve Two Masters

The Biblical admonition that a person cannot serve two
masters is at the heart of the problem in applying a fiduciary
standard to a broker-dealers transaction-based commission
business. By its very nature as a for-profit entity, a brokerdealer will inherently act in its own financial interest by dealing
for its own account and by striving to maximize its profits.
50
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 913, 124 Stat. 1376, 1826 (2010).
51
Id. § 913(b)(1)–(2).
52
Id. § 913(g).
53
SEC STUDY, supra note 2, at i.
54
Id. at v–vi.
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Consequently, there is an inherent fatal flaw in the SEC’s
recommendation to apply a universal fiduciary standard. The
universal fiduciary duty standard, as put forth by the SEC study,
consists of two parts: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.55
The duty of loyalty is the primary tenet of a fiduciary standard,
and violating it negates the very meaning of what it means to be
a fiduciary.56 Under the duty of loyalty, the broker or adviser is
prohibited from placing their interest ahead of the interests of
the customer and is required to disclose any conflicts of interest.57
Under the duty of care, a broker or adviser is held to minimum
standards of review and analysis when making investment
recommendations
or
otherwise
providing
personalized
58
investment advice to retail customers.
In other words, a
broker-dealer that owes a duty of loyalty to its shareholders to
make a profit would be violating the duty of loyalty it owes to it
customers.
Should a broker-dealer that makes a
recommendation to a customer of a non-discretionary account
somehow “ensure” that its recommendation is solely in the best
interest of the customer and at least on par or better than the
broker-dealer’s best interest? Shouldn’t the recommendation be
suitable for the customer and then left to the customer to make
the final call?
C.

The Small Investor Loses Out

A fiduciary duty is an ongoing obligation between the party
that owes the duty of loyalty and care to the person relying on
that duty.59 Investment advisers are compensated generally by a
percentage-fee charged against their client’s assets under
management.60 This compensation scheme is consistent with the

55

Id. at vi.
Cheryl Goss Weiss, A Review of the Historic Foundations of Broker-Dealer
Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 23 J. CORP. L. 65, 68 & n.5 (1997).
57
SEC STUDY, supra note 2, at 112.
58
Id. at 123.
59
Weiss, supra note 56, at 68.
60
See Christopher Condon, The Rise of the Registered Investment Adviser,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/content/11_11/b4219041484091.htm (noting that most advisors do not
depend on commission and instead, typically charge a fixed annual percentage of the
client’s money).
56
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fiduciary duty. The investment adviser makes more money as
his client’s assets increase; thus, the duties and their
pocketbooks are aligned.
For brokers who are paid commissions based upon individual
investment transaction recommendations, the suitability
standard is also consistent with their duties and pocketbooks. A
broker gets paid for a suitable recommendation made at that
time. To impose a fiduciary duty would extend a broker’s duty
beyond a single transaction recommendation. Now the broker
would have to provide on-going monitoring of client’s accounts,
looking always to ensure the client’s financial accounts are
working in the client’s best interest. A commission based
compensation scheme cannot support adherence to a fiduciary
duty imposed on a broker dealer. Thus, broker-dealers would
most likely move to a percentage fee charged against assets
under management model to support the enhanced requirements
of the fiduciary duty. In order to make money, broker-dealers
will require minimum assets for them to manage, just like
investment advisers require. The small investor will not have
the assets needed to get professional recommendations and
advice until they are able to grow their own accounts perhaps
through the use of online brokerage firms. Only individuals with
sizable assets will be able to obtain the assistance of a broker or
investment adviser.
D. Caveat Emptor
The recommendation of a fiduciary duty for a registered
representative of a broker-dealer emphatically ignores the
relationship between a registered representative and a client.
Caveat emptor, the Latin phrase for “let the buyer beware,”
proclaims that the buyer must perform her own due diligence
when purchasing an item or service. Brokers, dealers, and
advisors commonly lack authority to perform transactions or
commit a customer’s property without prior customer approval,
and most clients of a registered representative do not wish to
grant this power; in other words, the broker cannot exercise
discretion.61 In short, a broker is a salesperson. Accordingly,
imposition of a fiduciary duty on a salesperson conflicts with the
61
See Weiss, supra note 56, at 76 (requiring that the broker execute the
customer’s order “in exact conformity to the customer’s instructions”).
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purpose of the sales profession—to make money.62 Why does it
appear that lawmakers and regulators alike want to credit
broker dealer salespersons with knowledge beyond the minimum
requirements enacted to become an investment salesperson? If
the belief in our culture is that someone who calls themselves a
“financial adviser” or “financial representative” is credited with
expertise beyond required training, then educational
requirements for entry into the financial investing world should
be raised by regulation.
A broker’s livelihood is based upon the amount of
commissions earned with each sale. Like with any non-financial
salesperson, most consumers automatically go on the defensive
because they know the goal of the salesperson is to make the
sale.
Instinctively, the general public is skeptical of a
salesperson’s “puffery,” has a desire to shop around with other
vendors, and seeks out additional advice before making a
purchase.63 Protecting people from themselves is a deadweight
that kills growth, entrepreneurialism, opportunities, including
job opportunities, and investor returns.64 It adds nothing to the
wealth of society and, indeed, prevents the functioning of a
healthy economy.65
Morgan Clemons in his paper,
Harmonization v. Demarcation: The Problems with a Broker
Fiduciary Duty and the Benefits of the Merrill Rule, clearly
articulates the innate defense mechanism within the general
public regarding sales persons. He states:
While there are so-called “lemon laws” for cars, implied
warranties for various products, etc., arguably these are duties
of care and not duties of loyalty; no one expects that a car
salesman will sell the car that is in the customer’s budget
necessarily but rather the car that may yield him the higher
commission from that particular sale.66
62
Morgan Clemons, Harmonization v. Demarcation: The Problems with a
Broker Fiduciary Duty and the Benefits of the Merrill Rule 27 (Oct. 28, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1699274.
63
Id.
64
See id. at 27–29 (analogizing brokers to salesmen and stating that if salesmen
had to propose the best car for the individual, they would charge more to cover the
cost of the training that would help ensure that the advice given is accurate and
would be inclined to sell a narrow class of American-made cars, causing customers to
resort to markets overseas).
65
See id.
66
Id. at 27–28.
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The investing public must change their views of investment
salespersons to be more in line with the views the general public
exhibits for the car salesman. An effort should be made through
the American educational system, regulatory notices, and public
service messages to heighten the public’s knowledge of the
interests of broker-dealers as salespersons.
Broker-dealers
should be required to provide plain English language disclosures
agreed upon by regulators disclosing the conflicts. Customers
should shop around, meet different brokers, and get
recommendations from family and friends before selecting
someone who will provide recommendations. Regulators should
not be so hesitant to punish salespersons for unsuitable
recommendations, and the marketplace should put out of
business those brokers whose recommendations consistently lose
their client’s money.
CONCLUSION
The imposition of a fiduciary duty onto the broker or
salesman will create a barrier to the availability of investment
advice to the small investor. If the investor can afford an
investment advisor, that relationship will be governed by the
fiduciary standard of care and the costs associated with it. If the
investor
can
only
afford
transaction-by-transaction
recommendations, that option should not be eliminated. Instead
of regulations that would result in fewer investment options for
the small investor, the focus of regulators should be on informing
and educating the public, and aggressively pursuing brokers and
investment advisers who violate existing rules and obligations.
Concurrently, investors are encouraged to take a stronger
interest in the qualifications, reputations and success of the
individuals they seek to compensate for investment
recommendations. Brokers are part of a transaction based
compensation system where the product is central and their
advice is incidental. The inverse is found in the investment
adviser-client relationship; the product is incidental to the
advice. Therein lies the dilemma: How could a fiduciary
standard, which would require disinterested investment advice,
be reconciled with a compensation structure linked to the
product? It would not be reconciled; the average investor will
lose access to transactional investment brokers, and access to
professional investment advice would be limited to the wealthy.

